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At the Law Department’s Alumni/ae Dinner on September 6, 2006, William
Nelson read excerpts from his forthcoming book, Fighting for the City: A History of the
New York City Corporation Counsel.1 He reached a remarkable conclusion: for the two
decades from 1946 to 1965, the Catholic Archdiocese of New York exerted a
considerable inf luence over the leadership at the Law Department, and led the
Department astray to engage in the pursuit of Communists in city government. The
author’s thesis seemed to be: (1) the Catholic Church was vigorously anti-Communist;
(2) all Corporation Counsels during this period were practicing Catholics, of Irish
heritage from Brooklyn; and, therefore, (3) the Law Department’s enforcement of
anti-Communist loyalty statutes must be attributable to the Catholic Church. This
syllogism is quite defective. The thesis continues: not only were the Corporation
Counsels Catholic, most of them graduated from a less prestigious, Church-affiliated
law school—the Fordham University School of Law. The implication is that they
were either overly-attentive or outright submissive to ecclesiastical dictates. At the
time, I expressed my doubts about the validity of the author’s theory. I was assured
that others shared my concern and that the matter would be corrected.
When I received the final version of the book in January 2008, in connection
with the seminar which was held on February 6, 2008, at New York Law School, I
was distressed to find that the conclusion, now set forth at length in Chapter Seven
of the history, had not been corrected at all, except for the insertion of a single false
disclaimer. 2 Since there was no correction of the author’s assertions and rank
speculation continued to substitute for fact, I protested. Both the Law Department
and New York Law School suggested I comment in writing so that my responses
could be considered at the symposium to be held at the law school on February 6,
2008. This writing is an amplification of my comments.
A history commissioned to honor the memory of Allen G. Schwartz should be
accurate and not based on speculation or vilification.3 Instead, we are treated to the
author’s own idiosyncratic view of the Law Department during the two decades
following World War II. To paraphrase the late Senator Daniel Moynihan, the
author may be entitled to his opinions, but he is not entitled to his own facts. I write
now to set the record straight and to correct the author’s misinterpretations and
mistakes in the order in which he makes them.
As an initial matter, the author pays little attention to the tremendous changes in
New York City during the post-war years. There is no discussion of the city’s
remarkable growth, the enactment of anti-discrimination legislation to address the
rapid changes in the city’s demographic composition, new highways that carved up
1.

William E. Nelson, Fighting for the City: A History of the New York City Corporation
Counsel (2008).

2.

See id. at 210.

3.

In his February 1, 2008, reply to my initial letter, the author states that Michael Cardozo instructed
him that “the book had to be dedicated to Allen Schwartz and that it had to recognize the special
contribution that Allen made to the creation of the Law Department as we know today.” Response
from William E. Nelson to author (Feb. 1, 2008) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
All of us who respect Allen Schwartz’s memory are pleased that Mr. Cardozo had the foresight to so
instruct the author. Otherwise, he would have been free, as he stated, to “determine the book’s
substance.” Id. at 2.
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communities, urban renewal programs and policies, new housing programs, the
state’s takeover of the city subways, the rise of municipal labor unions, massive shifts
in the economy, or the adoption of a new zoning code and landmarks law, which still
governs the city today. The Law Department was involved in all of these changes,
and many more. Rather than analyze the Law Department’s work on these critical
issues, however, we are treated to the author’s screed on the Red Scare. Though it
was a decidedly dark moment in American history, the Law Department was only
one of many actors in this drama. The polemic continues on the Corporation
Counsel’s qualifications and on some Law Department employees who are said not
to have worked very hard. It is hard to divine what these personal ad hominem attacks
add to the history of the Law Department.
Concerning the supposedly reduced qualifications of the Corporation Counsels
during this period, the men who served O’Dwyer, Impellitteri, and Wagner were
quite able, as their subsequent careers demonstrated.4 Murphy and his family created
Capital City Broadcasting, which later took over the ABC Network; McGrath
formed his own law firm and served as the president of East New York Savings
Bank; Adrian Burke went on to the New York Court of Appeals; Leo Larkin became
General Counsel at W.R. Grace & Co.; and Charles Tenney, a distinguished United
States district judge.
The author seems to suggest that the Corporation Counsels were less qualified
for the position, in part, because they attended Fordham Law School, rather than a
more prestigious—read Ivy League—law school. Tenney, for example, a Yale
graduate, is not criticized, because he had “a different background and political
sensibility.”5 Attendance at Fordham does not mean the student was of limited
ability; it reflects other matters. Before World War II, Catholics and Jews were
excluded from Ivy League schools or admitted in only small numbers. As members
of first- or second-generation immigrant families hit hard by the Depression, many
lacked the resources to attend distant law schools. Thus, the fact that many Catholics
and Jews went to Fordham and other local law schools probably reflects the social
and economic realities of the interwar period. The appointment of Fordham
graduates as Corporation Counsel does not indicate, as the author suggests, a
diminishment or reduction in quality. It means that qualified people were coming
from different, and heretofore disenfranchised, segments of our population.
The suggestion that the Archdiocese of New York or Cardinal Spellman had a
special influence during this period is rebutted by the fact that all the Corporation
Counsels came from Brooklyn. If the Archdiocese or Cardinal Spellman had the
claimed influence the author suggests, the Corporation Counsel would have come
from Manhattan or the Bronx, where the Archdiocese is located. Brooklyn is a
separate, independent diocese, with its own hierarchy.
It is far more likely that Corporation Counsels being from Brooklyn reflected an
allocation of inter-borough political power. Politics has always played a role in the
4.

See Nelson, supra note 1, at 183–88.

5.

Id. at 187.
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governance of the city. And politics and geography have always played a role in what
persons are appointed to which positions. The Board of Estimate was composed not
only of the three city-wide officials, but also the five borough presidents, whose chief
responsibility was to advocate for his borough’s needs in the city budget. But the
borough presidents also had to accommodate important constituents in city offices.
To this end, the city developed something of an appointment allocation arrangement
based on borough characteristics. For example, Staten Island might be particularly
interested in who ran the ferries. Accordingly, a Staten Island resident would be
preferred for a Ports and Terminals post. Likewise, the Borough of Queens has the
largest system of roads. Its borough president might advocate for a Queens resident
to be the head of Transportation. It is not surprising then that another borough,
Brooklyn, had a hold on the Corporation Counsel post.6
The sourcing of the author’s quotes is troublesome. Sometimes, Chapter VII
reads more like a breathless disclosure in the New York Post. There are a series of
quotes about a “long term” lawyer who describes Corporation Counsels who long
preceded him in a disparaging way.7 It is not clear whether the source of this
information is Edith Spivack or John Hogrogian. It is important to distinguish
between the two. Hogrogian, of course, is not a historian, and it is not clear whether
Ms. Spivack was really speaking for the record or simply passing time with
Hogrogian’s tape recorder. Ms. Spivack is entitled to her opinion; she knew and
worked with the individuals who are mentioned. Hogrogian was not even born
when some of them were serving. And if he is the actual source for the author’s
comments, then he (not Edith Spivack) should be cited.
As to Edward J. McLaughlin, who is said to be “bright but not interested in
working hard,” 8 what legitimate historical purpose is served by insulting and
demeaning the memory of the departed? I met Mr. McLaughlin many times when
he and other “old timers” would join Ms. Spivack in her office and recall the “glory
days of yesteryear.” She always told me he was a wonderful gentleman who worked
hard and helped establish the Law Department’s excellent reputation. She never said
what is attributed to her in this history.9
6.

Mayors are accustomed to these informal arrangements. The story is told that when Mayor O’Brien
was elected, he was asked who his Commissioners were going to be. He replied that he did not know
because the leaders—both political and elected—had not told him yet. Chris McNickle, To Be
Mayor of New York: Ethnic Politics in the City 80–81 (1993). When Ed Koch appointed Bob
McGuire as his Police Commissioner, Gabe Pressman asked Koch, “What is so new or remarkable
about that? The Police Commissioner has always been an Irish Catholic.” Koch turned to McGuire
and deadpanned, “Bob, you told me you were Jewish.” Id. at 271–72.

7.

See Nelson, supra note 1, at 187.

8.

Id. at 190 (quoting Interview of John Hogrogian with Edith Spivack (May 29, 2003) (on file with the
Law Department)).

9.

I do not believe the author realizes how out of touch he is with what goes on in the Corporation
Counsel’s office. He portrays Peter Campbell Brown as quixotic for suggesting that the “[c]ity could
acquire land by eminent domain and sell it to the Brooklyn Dodgers to build a new stadium and thereby
dissuade the team from moving to Los Angeles . . . .” Id. at 195. But that is just what the Bloomberg
administration did to attract the basketball Nets to Brooklyn. The Law Department was surely involved
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That said, I want to focus on the author’s views discussed under the heading, “B.
The Politics of Demagoguery,” where he elaborates on his remarkable thesis that the
Catholic Archdiocese of New York dominated the work of the Law Department for
the two decades of the post-War period, and induced Catholic Corporation Counsels
to pursue Communists in city government. 10
During the post-World War II decades, American democracy was in a battle
with Soviet dictatorship and our system of capitalism was engaged in a titanic
struggle with worldwide Communism. In retrospect, it might be said that the Law
Department—indeed all of America—could have done a better job in resisting the
“Red Scare.” It is quite another thing to say it failed to do so because the Corporation
Counsel was a Catholic. The author believes “context” is important.11 During the
years from 1946 to 1965, the full context must include, at a minimum, America’s
reaction to what the Soviet Union did to Eastern Europe, turning independent
nations into captive satellite states; to the Berlin Airlift; to China’s fall to Communism;
to the treaty alliances in Europe and Asia to contain the spread of Communism; to
the Korean war; to the enactment of loyalty programs at the federal, state, and local
levels; to immigration legislation to keep Communists out of the United States; and
to the entire atmosphere of the Cold War. America’s battle against worldwide
Communism continued for more than four decades. In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan
was still referring to the Soviet Union as the “evil empire.” All of this is context.
America’s concern with Communism was not limited locally to New York. It was a
national concern and it was not limited temporally, as it spanned over four decades.
Here in New York City, the Law Department was not the only entity to engage
in a vigorous form of anti-Communism. For example, in the 1940s and 1950s, David
Dubinsky and Alex Rose led their unions out of the American Labor Party, because
it was Communist-dominated and founded New York’s Liberal Party. Dubinsky and
Rose recognized that being labeled “Communist” was fatal to the accomplishment of
their labor and political goals. Further, there was a strong reaction in New York City
to the revival of anti-Semitic purges in the Soviet Union and the exiling of Russian
Jews to Siberia in the late 1940s.12 From diving under desks in public school air raid
drills to watching grainy images of congressional witch hunts, for all Americans,

with that project, including condemnation of privately held property, with resale or long-term lease to
the developer. The Law Department has been involved in various economic development deals for New
York’s sports teams, including the New York Yankees, the New York Mets, and the U.S. Tennis Open.
This occurred during the Koch, Dinkins, and Giuliani years, and, as indicated, continues in the
Bloomberg administration. None of these mayoral initiatives could succeed without the full cooperation
of the Law Department and the Corporation Counsel. The author cannot deny that.
10. Id. at 193–218.
11.

The author’s reply of February 1, 2008, says it is the historian’s task to place known events in a “broader
context.” Context does not justify speculation, however, and it cannot substitute for the facts. Nelson
Response, supra note 3, at 1.

12. See McNickle, supra note 6, at 81.
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including all New Yorkers, there was a steady drum beat of anti-Communist talk.13
Had the Law Department stood up against this onslaught, it would have been
perhaps the only public law agency in America to do so.
Nor was this Red Scare unprecedented: America engaged in the great Red Raids
after World War I.14 Interning Japanese citizens during World War II is another
unfortunate example of what America does when it feels threatened. Perhaps some
of this same attitude explains our combined legislative, executive, and judicial actions
in the post-9/11 world. These fevers which overcome the American body politic
from time to time do not have their primary source in the Catholic Church. Perhaps
the source is worthy of analysis, but it does not belong in the history of the New York
City Law Department.
I dwell on this because it is ludicrous to think that the Law Department and
Corporation Counsels were somehow acting on the Church’s anti-Communist
bidding. The Law Department was simply doing what it had always done: analyzing,
interpreting, and enforcing the laws on the books. Indeed, buried within the text is
the reason for the Law Department’s actions: state legislation that insisted on a
loyalty regime and the exclusion of Communists from civil service and public
schools.15 Moreover, these laws survived sustained constitutional scrutiny by the
Supreme Court. The author seems to find fault with “lawyers, in thrall to a
13. No less a legal mind than Judge Learned Hand, writing for the Second Circuit in United States v.

Dennis, demonstrates just how ingrained the perceived threat of Communism was in American legal
circles:
The American Communist Party, of which the defendants are the controlling spirits, is a
highly articulated, well contrived, far spread organization, numbering thousands of
adherents, rigidly and ruthlessly disciplined, many of whom are infused with a passionate
Utopian faith that is to redeem mankind. It has its Founder, its apostles, its sacred texts—
perhaps even its martyrs. It seeks converts far and wide by an extensive system of schooling,
demanding of all an inflexible doctrinal orthodoxy. The violent capture of all existing
governments is one article of the creed of that faith, which abjures the possibility of success
by lawful means. That article, which is a common-place among initiates, is a part of the
homiletics for novitiates, although, so far as conveniently it can be, it is covered by an
innocent terminology, designed to prevent its disclosure. Our democracy, like any other,
must meet that faith and that creed on the merits, or it will perish; and we must not flinch
at the challenge.
183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950). The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and adopted Judge
Hand’s formulation of the clear and present danger test. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510
(1951).
14.

The Espionage Act of 1917, as amended by the Sedition Act of 1918, proscribed promoting the success
of and rendering aid to America’s enemies. In Debs v. United States, a Socialist who had previously run
for president of the United States was tried, convicted, and imprisoned for violating the Espionage Act
of 1917. 249 U.S. 211 (1919). Additionally, in Gitlow v. New York, the Supreme Court also sustained
New York’s indictment and conviction for anarchy (i.e., advocating the overthrow of government by
force or violence) of a Socialist who published a “Left Wing Manifesto.” 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Of
course, prosecutions such as those in Debs and Gitlow might not be possible today, but as of the postWorld War II decades, the Supreme Court’s holdings on the First Amendment had not yet evolved to
today’s more rigorous standards for protecting speech and association.

15.

Judge Hand underscored the motivation for such laws in holding that the potential infiltration of
Communists in American government posed a “clear and present” danger:
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majoritarian democratic ethos.”16 But the Law Department is not a free agent. It did
what the law requires: operate within the legal framework and enforce the law,
especially laws that, on challenge, are found to be constitutional by the highest court
in the land. In all of these circumstances, it is passing strange to suggest that the
Law Department agenda was hijacked by the Catholic Church when it simply served
the city in the same capacity it always had.
While Communism certainly had an impact on the Catholic Church in Eastern
Europe,17 the fact is that the author is simply speculating when he claims the events
influenced how the Law Department practiced law. Nothing in the Law Department
files or opinions suggests any such relationship. In his February 1, 2008 rejoinder,
the author complains that limiting his research to the Law Department’s file would
be “antiquarian.”18 But at the symposium held on February 6, 2008, the author
called for the Catholic Church to open up its files so that he or others might continue
to search for any evidence of his remarkable thesis.
As to the Catholic Church’s view on the Establishment Clause, disputes over
public aid to parochial education are well known and still on-going. It is not unusual
for church groups to seek public benefits available to others. I might add that these
efforts are not limited to Catholics.19 With regard to goals of the Catholic Church,
surely one of the Law Department’s greatest victories was Walz v. Tax Commissioner
of New York, which sustained a New York State law that made churches, temples, and
other charitable institutions exempt from real property taxes. 20 The author states
that the city’s victory was “clearly . . . correct,” and that the city “clearly was right” to
defend a law enacted by the state legislature.21 But, as we have already seen, the
author thinks that other validly enacted statutes (e.g., loyalty oaths) should not have
been enforced. He does not intimate, however, how one is to discern what statutes
should or should not be enforced. Obviously, it cannot be done forty years after the
fact.

True, we must not forget our own faith; we must be sensitive to the dangers that lurk in
any choice; but choose we must, and we shall be silly dupes if we forget that again and
again in the past thirty years, just such preparations in other countries have aided to
supplant existing governments, when the time was ripe. Nothing short of a revived
doctrine of laissez faire, which would have amazed even the Manchester School at its
apogee, can fail to realize that such a conspiracy creates a danger of the utmost gravity and
of enough probability to justify its suppression.
Dennis, 183 F.2d at 213.
16. Nelson, supra note 1, at 196.
17.

See id. at 197–99.

18. See Nelson Response, supra note 3, at 1.
19.

See generally Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (Christian); Bd. of
Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (Jewish); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (Evangelical).

20. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
21.

Nelson, supra note 1, at 246–47.
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The author talks of a sermon given by a priest in 1949 at a mass celebrated by a
Cardinal in a cathedral.22 Shortly after the sermon, we are told, the Law Department
began its pursuit of Communists. The reader is not told how many Law Department
officials or employees were there to hear the sermon. I am sure the sermon was
given, but the fact that the Law Department started pursuing subversive groups
shortly after the sermon does not mean the two events are related. The logical fallacy
has a Latin name, which I will give, even at the risk of being called a Catholic: post
hoc ergo propter hoc. Indeed, they are not related, as the author admits, because the
Law Department’s implementation of the loyalty program started two years earlier in
1947.23
The basis for the Law Department’s actions was the New York State statute,
which mandated a loyalty program, and not the 1949 sermon in a cathedral. The
lawyer in charge of investigating alleged Communist infiltration into the civil service
ranks was Saul Moskoff.24 He was from Queens, not Brooklyn, and he certainly was
not an Irish Catholic. In one of the reminiscences attributed to Edith Spivack, she
said she felt badly that “Saul had undertaken to do this kind of prosecuting”; 25 not
badly enough, however, to leave the Law Department in protest. Indeed, Edith
Spivack was still there fifty years after Saul Moskoff stopped prosecuting Communists
who were city employees.
The author also does something else that is an open attempt to introduce
prejudice. He quotes from a speech by Peter Campbell Brown whose “rhetoric [was]
reminiscent of that used several years earlier” by the priest who gave a sermon at
which a Cardinal celebrated mass in a cathedral.26 A few pages later, the author
repeats the same tactic. This time, he demonstrates how absurd his argument is. He
notes that the constitutionality of New York State’s loyalty statute was affirmed by
the U.S. Supreme Court in an opinion by Mr. Justice Sherman Minton “in language
strikingly similar to that appearing earlier in the Brooklyn Tablet.”27
At issue in Adler v. New York City Board of Education28 was the constitutionality
of the Feinberg Law, enacted by the New York State legislature and signed into law
by Governor Dewey. 29 The Feinberg Law barred from civil service employment
those who advocated the overthrow of government by force or violence and prevented
Communists from teaching in New York State’s public schools. While the case was

22.

Id. at 200.

23.

Id. at 201.

24.

Id. at 203.

25.

Id. at 204.

26. Id. at 202.
27.

Id. at 204–05. The Brooklyn Tablet is the Catholic Newspaper of the Brooklyn Diocese.

28. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
29. Feinberg Law, N.Y. Educ. Law § 3022 (Consol. 1949), invalidated by Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385

U.S. 589 (1967).
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argued when Denis Hurley was the Corporation Counsel, Michael Castaldi30 argued
the case for the city. With him on the brief were Seymour B. Quell31 and Bernie
Friedlander.32 The author claims to respect all of them, but does not explain how
they were overcome by this Catholic anti-Communist fever. Indeed, they were not:
they were simply very good lawyers doing their very best to interpret and apply the
law, without regard to religious support for a particular law. The New York Attorney
General’s office, represented by Wendell Brown, Nathaniel Goldstein, and Ruth
Kessler Toch, joined as amici, urging the constitutionality of the Feinberg Law. None
are Irish Catholics.
It is highly doubtful that Mr. Justice Minton read the Brooklyn Tablet. We know
he did not cite it in his opinion. The Supreme Court found six to three that the Law
Department’s enforcement of the Feinberg law was not unconstitutional.
If someone read the Supreme Court reports—as opposed to conjuring what the
Brooklyn Tablet may have said—one would appreciate the context of the decision. In
the two years immediately prior to Adler, the Supreme Court held that Congress and
the National Labor Relations Board could constitutionally require affidavits from
union officials attesting that they were not Communists.33 Further, the Court in
Dennis v. United States had sustained the convictions of leading members of the
Communist Party for advocating the overthrow of the government, in violation of
the Smith Act.34 The Dennis trial was conducted before Judge Harold Medina in the
Southern District of New York, just across the river from the Brooklyn Supreme
Court where Adler was tried. The chief prosecutor in Dennis was Irving Saypol, later
a distinguished New York State Supreme Court judge. Yet, no one can claim that
the federal government’s decision to prosecute Communists can be attributed to the
Catholic Church. No such claim is made against any other agency (e.g., the National
Labor Relations Board) for prosecuting Communists during the same period. I
submit that any claim that the city’s enforcement efforts against Communists is
attributable to a Corporation Counsel’s Catholicism is baseless.
The author does not tell us whether the Mayor directed the Law Department to
proceed to enforce the Feinberg law, or whether the Law Department acted on its
own. Either way, the Law Department had any number of good reasons to enforce
the Feinberg law—it was validly enacted by the state legislature, duly signed into law
by the governor, its enforcement was consistent with at least three decades of Supreme
Court precedents, and upon challenge, it was held to be constitutional by the Supreme
Court. None of these reasons have anything to do with religion or the religious
affiliation of the Corporation Counsel.
30. Castaldi is reported to be a “knowledgeable lawyer.” Nelson, supra note 1, at 189.
31.

Quell is “one of the bright young stars” who was the head of the Law Department’s Appeals Division.
Id. at 189.

32.

Bernie Friedlander was a long-time, distinguished lawyer who served well into the 1990s, and during
my tenure was one of the Law Department’s resident experts on municipal pension law.

33.

Am. Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).

34. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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The author objects to the notion that Catholics were pretending to be the “true
expression of Americanism.”35 The charge may reveal something about the author’s
own mindset, but it has nothing to do with the history of the Law Department.36
The author appears not to be mindful of American history which shows a prejudice
against Catholics, starting with the Know Nothing Party (a reaction to immigration
by the famine Irish); the Klu Klux Klan; “Rum, Romanism and Rebellion” during
the campaign of James G. Blaine for president; and the South’s (and the rest of the
country’s) reaction to Al Smith’s candidacy in 1928. Surely it is not unusual for the
objects of prejudice, here Catholics, to try to establish that they are Americans and
entitled the same blessings as any other citizen, regardless of their religious faith.
But that is a story for a different book. It does not belong in the history of the Law
Department.
It is a slur for the author to suggest that Tammany Hall—at the behest of the
Catholic Church—was attacking Jewish academics. 37 It will be recalled that the
Law Department’s prosecutor of Communists in city government was Saul Moskoff.
Surely, Catholic politicians never conducted pogroms against Jewish academics. New
York City was never run that way. The Tammany Hall politics was based on the
coalescing of differing racial, religious, and ethnic groups—Jews, Christians, Irish,
Italians, Poles, Russians, African-Americans, Hispanic Americans—into one
political party. The success of that formula kept Tammany Hall in power for a
majority of the first sixty years of the twentieth century. Certainly there were
tensions and conflicts, but Tammany’s strength was based on intergroup harmony,
not the promotion of discord.
After this sixteen-page attack, the author inserts a false disclaimer: “We should
pause here to ask who should be blamed for New York City’s Red Hunt and for the
Law Department’s role in it. Not, I urge, the Catholic Church.”38 This disclaimer
changes none of the false claims made in the prior sixteen pages, where the author
maintains precisely the opposite position.
The author suggests that the Law Department’s participation in the Red Hunt
could have been stopped had the Corporation Counsel and the legal staff at the Law
Department made professional judgments on the basis “of their understanding of the
law and of the obligations to the City as a whole.”39 I am sure that if any attorney at
the Law Department had a moral objection to enforcing constitutional statutes, she
or he would not be asked to do so. It is possible that the Law Department could
have challenged state and local law, or even federal law, which imposed a regime of
loyalty oaths and exclusion of Communists from government and trade unions. Such
35.

Nelson, supra note 1, at 207.

36. Indeed, the charge reflects a recurrent theme of American nativism, which seeks to impose a Protestant

or secular “Americanism” on an “un-American” Catholic minority. Philip Hamburger, Separation
of Church and State 191 (2002).
37.

See Nelson, supra note 1, at 208.

38. Id. at 209.
39.

Id. at 210–11.
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a position would have been unprecedented, however, and I am not aware that any
public law organization ever did so. Certainly, Supreme Court decisions stretching
over thirty years consistently held that federal and state loyalty programs and the
banning of Communists from public employment and labor unions were
constitutionally permissible. Perhaps most lawyers at the Law Department believed
that validly enacted statutes should be enforced, until held to be invalid by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The author’s argument might be a worthy subject for legal
philosophy, but it does not remotely suggest that the Catholic Church led the Law
Department astray.
The falseness of the purported disclaimer40 is further demonstrated by the
author’s immediate return to the attack. This time, we are told that Adrian Burke’s
“campaign against smut” was linked to the Catholic Church’s campaign against
secularism and sin.41 Mr. Justice Frankfurter upheld the constitutionality of the
statute by which the Corporation Counsel had obtained an injunction “against one
Louis Finkelstein”42 in Kingsley Books v. Brown.43 According to the author, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter’s opinion “contained the usual echoes of religiosity.”44 Any
assumption that these echoes were seeded in Justice Frankfurter’s mind by Peter
Campbell Brown, who succeeded Burke, and mouthed Catholic pieties when he
argued the case before the Supreme Court, would not be well-grounded. Brown did
not argue the case; Seymour Quell did, and Fred J. Iscol45 wrote the brief.
The author’s mischaracterization of the decision continues: “[f]or the five justice
majority, . . . as for Corporation Counsel and the Catholic hierarchy . . . the
government could properly restrain citizens from succumbing to the temptation of
sin.”46
According to the author, the decision was an effort to “protect citizens from sin
so that those citizens could remain free to do God’s will.”47 Even a casual reading of
Kingsley demonstrates how absurd this is. The opinion does not reek of “religiosity”;
but rather it is an arid analysis of the First Amendment and section 22(a) of the New
York Code of Criminal Procedure, which provided for the seizure of materials found
to be obscene after a non-jury trial.48 The law at issue was enacted by the New York
40. See id. at 209; see also supra text accompanying note 38.
41.

See Nelson, supra note 1, at 185, 211.

42.

Id. at 212.

43.

354 U.S. 436, 445 (1957).

44. Nelson, supra note 1, at 212.
45.

Iscol is reported to be “an older man” who “read all of the advance sheets” and was a source of both
wisdom and guidance to younger lawyers at the Law Department. Id. at 189–90. His reputation is
well-deserved.

46. Id. at 212.
47.

Id.

48. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 22(a) (2007) (current version at N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6330 (McKinney 1996)); see

also Laws of the State of New York, ch. 925, § 22(a) (1941) (providing the original language of N.Y.
Crim. Proc. Law § 22(a) (1941)).
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State legislature in 1941, signed into law by Governor Herbert Lehman, and amended
in 1954 when Thomas Dewey was the governor. Louis Lefkowitz, the Attorney
General of New York, appeared as amicus, urging the constitutional validity of the
New York statute. Lehman, Dewey, Lefkowitz, Quell, and Iscol were not Irish or
Catholic; and they were not under the thumb of the Catholic Church.
The author clearly prefers the dissenters who were “unabashedly secularist.”49
Incidentally, one of the secularists whom the author prefers is Mr. Justice Brennan.
Justice Brennan was a Catholic, but we can all agree that he was under no one’s
thumb.
The Law Department is belittled for taking on “a number of other endeavors to
please other Tammany constituencies.”50 These efforts included protecting the rent
control laws and fighting Con Ed rate increases. Tammany is long gone now, but
even today, the Law Department is engaged in similar efforts to maintain rent control
and rent stabilization; it fights rate increases sought by regulated utilities; it
participates in efforts to keep housing in the Mitchell-Lama program and resists
owners’ attempts to buy out their subsidized mortgages and go to market rates. The
Law Department has always helped to preserve the economic well-being of New
Yorkers; I hope it continues to do so.
Fair readers of this chapter will come to their own conclusions. I believe that
Allen G. Schwartz’s blessed memory would be far better served by an accurate history
than it is by the author’s unfortunate opinions.

49. Nelson, supra note 1, at 212.
50. Id. at 213.
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